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1  Introduction 
Demands on water and land in Namibia are increasing steadily as the population and the econ-
omy grow. Although only a few households can survive on subsistence agriculture alone, access 
to agricultural land remains central to livelihoods strategies particularly in the non-freehold or 
communal areas of Namibia. The importance of agriculture is not only likely to remain, but will 
increase to the extent that population growth continues to exceed the creation of employment 
opportunities.  
Apart from rising demands on water and land by an increasing rural population, competition for 
land and water is also increasing steadily. The driving factor behind this is the growing need to 
commercialise and diversify agricultural activities in the communal areas. The National Agri-
cultural Policy identified agricultural production in the northern communal areas as having the 
biggest potential for intensification and diversification. Amongst other things, it therefore pro-
poses to convert some of the 7 million hectares of under-utilised land north of the Veterinary 
Cordon Fence into extensive livestock production systems and increase irrigation activities up 
to five-fold (MAWRD 1995: 14, 29).  
Specific interventions have been implemented to achieve these objectives. By 2007, 721 small-
scale commercial farms had been surveyed in the northern communal areas, with the proclaimed 
aim of integrating ‘communal subsistence farmers into the mainstream of the Namibia agricul-
tural economy by creating a favourable environment for them to increase agricultural productiv-
ity’ (MLR 2007: 4). Most of this land requires the development of water points to become pro-
ductive. Along similar lines, Namibia’s Green Scheme proposes to develop up to 43,000 ha for 
irrigation along Namibia’s perennial rivers over the next 30 years. Most of this will happen in 
the Kavango and Caprivi regions. The objectives of the Green Scheme include the creation of a 
class of agricultural entrepreneurs who come from previously disadvantaged communities who 
will be enabled to produce commercially for regional markets and beyond. It is anticipated that 
the Scheme will improve nutrition at household level, create employment, diversify the agricul-
tural base and provide secure livelihoods for growing rural populations (Grimm and Werner 
2005: 12–15). 
Sectoral approaches to land and water management provide fertile ground for conflict, as each 
sector has its specific objectives and mandate (DRFN 2005: 23). Development Plans with their 
specific targets and implementation strategies are developed with little regard of other sector 
plans. The need to balance national objectives as articulated in Vision 2030 and National De-
velopment Plans with equity concerns is becoming increasingly acute, as more demands are 
being made on land and water for economic development.  
To compound matters, the existing institutional framework particularly at local level, is increas-
ingly unable to regulate these conflicting pressures ‘because the current water and land rights 
are too loosely coordinated’ (Kluge et al 2006: 21). Two related issues can be identified that 
may have contributed to this state of affairs.  
Firstly, different sectoral objectives are not integrated into a comprehensive regional, let alone 
water basin development plan. Consequently, there is no agreement on how competing demands 
on land and water can be solved. How important is the role of access to land and water for pov-
erty alleviation as opposed to the commercial development of communal pastures for commer-
cial farming or production of irrigation for export, for example? And: is the development of 
wildlife utilisation more or less important than commercial livestock farming?  CuveWaters Papers, No. 5 
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The absence of an agreed vision leads to the second issue. Because there is no cross sectoral 
development plan, rights to land, water and other natural resources are determined by sectoral, 
rather than overarching national and regional development objectives. As this paper will show, 
this has created a situation where rights over resources conferred to individuals and groups by 
sector policies are not only inconsistent, but even contradictory. This is an important point, par-
ticularly in view of the fact that customary tenure rules governing access to land and water have 
changed over the years. Amongst other things, the increasing integration of rural economies into 
a market economy has led to the gradual separation of communal and private interests. As op-
portunities arose for private profit possibilities, dependence on the group decreased ‘which in 
turn reduce[d] its authority’ (Vlachos 1995: 14). 
These developments, coupled with post-Independence policies that put more emphasis on hu-
man rights and increased participation of subjects in managing their own affairs has brought 
about a plethora of new policies and institutions, which to a greater or lesser extent were de-
signed to promote local participation in development planning and management. The principle 
of community based management of natural resources was introduced before Independence in 
the wildlife sector. After Independence this approach was applied to the water sector.  
The aim of this paper is to review the policy and legal framework guiding regional and local 
level institutions in the sector. The functions and powers of these will be briefly discussed and 
assessment provided on how these are likely to impact on access to land. This assessment re-
quires a critical review of land related policies and laws in order to obtain an understanding 
about the extent to which the rights to natural resources conferred in these two sectors are simi-
lar or perhaps contradictory.  
Before discussing water and land related policies and legislation, a few general observations on 
participation are useful to obtain more conceptual clarity where rhetoric frequently obscures 
rather than enlightens policy impacts. 
 
 
2  Participation and decentralisation: general observations 
Decentralisation and increased popular participation in development issues has its origins in the 
SWAPO Election Manifesto of 1989, which committed the ruling party to the establishment of 
democratically elected authorities in urban and rural areas ‘in order to give power to the people 
at grassroots level, to make decisions on matter affecting their lives’. From this commitment 
flowed a Constitutional requirement to establish Regional and Local Government structures 
(RoN 2004: 205). In terms of the Constitution, Local Authority structures ‘include all munici-
palities, communities, village councils and other organs of local government defined and consti-
tuted by Act of Parliament’ (RoN n.d.: 54). A Decentralisation Policy was formulated in 1997 to 
give effect to these Constitutional principles (See Werner 2007: 8). 
The political importance attached to meaningful participation as a key component of democratic 
governance is reflected in Vision 2030. It states that many social and environmental issues are 
better managed at the local level, ‘where authority, proprietorship/tenure, rights and responsi-
bilities are devolved to appropriate local institutions and organisations’ including aspects of 
water point and rangeland management, wildlife and forest management (RoN 2004: 204). Vi-
sion 2030 holds that effective governance in support of long term sustainable development is 
dependent on decentralising and devolving government functions to the lowest effective level 
and to ensure coherence between policy options pursued at different levels. Finally, people at      
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the local level have to be able to exercise options to participate (Ibid: 205). The vision is that by 
2030  
Local communities and regional bodies are empowered, and are fully involved in 
the development process; they actually formulate and implement their respective 
development plans, while national government – working hand in hand with civil 
society  organisations  –  provides  the  enabling  environment  …  for  the  effective 
management of national, regional and local development efforts (Ibid: 206). 
This vision formulates very concisely what several sector policies have professed to do since the 
early 1990s. Policies in the land, water, agricultural and environmental sectors all commit gov-
ernment to participation of local communities in managing their resources by decentralising 
government functions. Upon closer examination, however, it appears that concepts such as par-
ticipation, decentralisation and devolution have different meanings in different contexts. Decen-
tralisation, as a catch all phrase for ‘bringing power to the people’ subsumes a wide spectrum of 
actual power transfer, ranging from very little to actual ownership of a resource. However, 
meaningful participation – and management – implies that local communities have the powers 
to do so.  
According to Tötemeyer (1996: 28) a fundamental feature of decentralisation is  
the transfer of authority, power and responsibility outwards and downwards from 
central government. The emphasis is on self-government, on self-management and 
self-administration.  
But decentralisation, or the transfer of power from higher to lower levels of decision making, 
can take several different forms, depending on the degree to which powers and responsibilities 
are transferred (Toulmin 2000: 230). The Decentralisation Policy (RoN 1997: 11) identified 
three different forms of decentralisation: 
·  Deconcentration: This refers to a process where central government decentralises staff to 
lower levels of government to carry out regular line functions closer to the target population. 
This aspect of decentralisation ‘does not allow any participation by the population in any 
form of decision making’ (my emphasis).  
·  Delegation: In this case, government allocates some of its functions to sub-national levels to 
carry out. These sub-national levels do not take full responsibility for these actions. Delega-
tion is usually done by the executive, rather than the legislature. 
·  Devolution: This involves  central  government  ‘giving  full responsibility  and public  ac-
countability for certain functions to the sub-national level’ (my emphasis).  
In terms of the Decentralisation Policy, the preferred model in Namibia is ‘devolution of power 
to lower tiers within the context and the overall authority of the unitary state’ (RoN 1997: 13). 
Put differently, it amounts to a transfer of power from a larger to a smaller unit (Toulmin 2000: 
230). 
In terms of Article 100 of the Namibian Constitution, all natural resources below and above the 
surface of the land, including land and water belong to the state unless they are not otherwise 
lawfully owned. Devolving responsibilities and accountability with regard to the management 
of natural resources requires that the state transfer rights to and powers of management over 
resource to the users of those resources. The content of those rights determines the extent of 
power the holders of such rights have to enforce them and take decisions.  CuveWaters Papers, No. 5 
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Implementing Integrated Land and Water Management is premised on the active participation of 
resource users. A major challenge in this regard is that land and water policy and legislation 
confer different rights to users. Consequently, individuals and local communities are empow-
ered to different degrees to take decisions with regard to the use of land and water. Instead of 
being complementary, these different rights and obligations often contradict each other. In the 
lands sector, the state has only granted secure rights to residential and arable land, while pasture 
land remains the property of communities. By contrast, water points on communal land are 
leased from the state, conferring rights to communities of water users that amount to ownership 
rights. It will be shown below, that this fundamental difference has significant implications for 
integrated land and water management.  
 
 
3  ILWM and BMCs 
In 1993 Cabinet approved the principle that community ownership and management of water 
facilities should be ‘the strategy of choice’ in the water and sanitation sectors in rural areas. It 
was assumed that an improvement of services would be brought about by co-operation between 
government and beneficiaries, based on community involvement and participation. This implied 
that communities in rural areas should have the right to determine which solutions and service 
levels are acceptable and affordable to them. Based on these policy directives, Cabinet approved 
the Community Based Management approach for rural water supply in 1997.  
Fundamental to the strategy of involving rural communities in the management of their water 
supplies was the establishment of water point committees and the gradual transfer of ownership 
of water points to these committees. Initially, the functions of water point committees were lim-
ited to managing individual water points. The driving force behind this initiative was govern-
ment’s desire to shift the financial costs of providing water to rural communities to the users of 
water. 
As a result of the Namibia Water Resources Management Review policies in the water sector 
were amended and broadened to incorporate wider environmental and economic issues. This 
reflected the realisation that the abstraction of water impacted on land use, health the environ-
ment and a host of other issues. Particularly in agriculture, which continues to form the basis of 
livelihoods for the vast majority of people in Namibia, land and water use could not be managed 
separately. Integrated Land and Water Management gradually evolved as the most appropriate 
approach to manage these resources in a holistic manner. In early 2004 planning in this direc-
tion started in all earnest. 
Within this new context, the powers and functions of Water Point Committees are likely to 
change from their initial, more limited briefs of managing water to more holistic ones. Before 
discussing the powers and functions of Water Point Committees, it is useful to look briefly at 
Integrated Land and Water Management and the institutional framework for its implementation. 
The Global Water Partnership defined integrated water resources management as 
a process which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, 
land and related resources, in order to maximise the resultant economic and social 
welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital 
ecosystems (Huppert 2006b: 20).      
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The most appropriate scale for integrated water and land management was considered to be a 
basin. This is defined as an  
area from which any rainfall will drain into the watercourse or watercourses or part 
of  a  watercourse,  through  surface  flow  to  a  common  point  or  common  points 
(MAWRD 2000: 44). 
This definition was broadened at a later stage to include groundwater into basin delineation. 
The Ministry of Agriculture Water and Forestry argued that in arid areas such as Namibia where 
‘water is the most constraining natural resource for development … a decentralised develop-
ment and management policy is logically to be organised on a water basin basis’. A water basin 
as a management unit facilitates more than any other approach ‘the relationship between water, 
land, vegetation and fauna and the water basin’s ecosystems’ (Nehemia in MAWRD 2004: 17).  
Altogether 24 individual basins were identified in Namibia. The geographical size of some ba-
sins was regarded as too big for the development of effective community-based management of 
land and water. Consequently, some basins were divided into sub-basins. Others were consid-
ered too small and were amalgamated, resulting in 11 basins by 2008. 
While the use of water basins as units for integrated water and land management is perfectly 
sensible for sustainable environmental policy, it is at odds with existing political, administrative 
and social units in so far as basins typically cover different areas of jurisdiction. The Etosha 
Basin, into which the Cuvelai-Iishana Sub-Basin falls, cuts across four administrative regions 
and eight traditional authority areas, for example. In addition, it includes a large number of con-
stituencies, some conservancies and a national park. In addition, local communities obtain water 
from an extensive pipeline network, boreholes, hand-dug wells and open water pans during the 
rainy season. Rights to land consist of usufructory customary rights to arable and residential 
land, commonage for grazing and land fenced off for private use. 
This brief summary of some salient features of the Etosha Basin serves to illustrate the tremen-
dous governance challenges that a basin approach generates in trying to move towards inte-
grated water and land management. The key question in this regard is how to co-ordinate the 
activities of such a large number of relatively independent actors so that they all contribute in a 
complimentary way towards the integrated management of water and land (Huppert 2006a).  
In order to address these challenges, the National Water Policy White Paper and the Water Re-
sources Management Act of 2004 provide for the establishment of basin management commit-
tees. These have been identified as the most appropriate units for operational management. Ba-
sin management committees are expected to enhance local empowerment and participation in 
decision making and planning. Empowering local communities to manage the water resources 
in their basins will not be limited to water, but will increase capacity to manage the overall de-
velopment process ‘as water is the basis for all development’ (Nehemia in MAWRD 2004: 17). 
Fundamental to the successful implementation of the basin management approach is that man-
agement and planning functions are devolved to local government and organisations. The politi-
cal will must exist to transfer power and resources to individual farmers, citizens and commu-
nity organisations to facilitate meaningful and active participation by stakeholders, particularly 
at the local level. Simultaneously, the state has to continue its governance functions, e.g. ensur-
ing that a balance is struck between equity concerns and national priorities (DRFN 2005: 24). 
The Water Resources Management Act, 2004 does not spell out in any detail how stakeholders 
at the local level will participate in the functions of basin management committees. More spe-
cifically, the role of local Water Users Associations and Water Point User Associations in Basin CuveWaters Papers, No. 5 
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Management Committees is unclear. Section 13(b) of the Act which simply states that Basin 
Management Committees should ‘promote community participation in the protection, use, de-
velopment, conservation, management and control of water resources in its management area’ 
raises a number of questions. Is the generic concept of community referring to local Water Users 
Associations and Water Point User Associations only, or are other community based associa-
tions that are stakeholders included? It is also not clear what degree of participation the Act 
foresees. Does it mean that ‘communities’ need to be consulted from time to time or should they 
have the power to take decisions? If so, what kinds of decisions? What are the powers that the 
state or its agents retain? (Alden-Wily 2000a: 3–4). 
The Act also does not state explicitly that stakeholders have to be actively involved in develop-
ing water resources plans for their basins (Section 13(c)). There is therefore a risk that the de-
velopment needs of local communities may be disregarded in formulating those plans. This 
point  seems  particularly  pertinent  in  view  of  the  fact  that  members  of  Basin  Management 
Committees are not elected by stakeholders but appointed by the Minister responsible for water 
affairs.  The  onus  is  on  the  Minister  to  ensure  ‘that  every  basin  management  committee  is 
broadly representative of all interested persons’ (Section 12(4)), but stakeholders have no legal 
mechanism to ensure that this is the case.  
The Minister has the power to dissolve basin management committees ‘for purposes of re-
organising water management institutions in [their] area[s] of jurisdiction in the interests of 
effective water resources management’ or because the circumstances that gave rise to the estab-
lishment of basin management committees have changed (Section 15). Neither the responsible 
Minister nor the Basin Management Committee is accountable to stakeholders for their actions. 
This suggests that despite rhetoric to the contrary, the basin management approach as provided 
for in the Water Resources Management Act of 2004 potentially limits the scope for meaningful 
participation of local communities in integrated water and land management beyond their com-
munities. While that the state as the ultimate owner of water and land has an obligation to en-
sure that these and other resources are used in a sustainable manner for the national good, the 
content of rights to water and land need to be spelled out in more detail to ensure that the needs 
of marginal communities are adequately represented and acknowledged at Basin level. Without 
such specific rights, local communities are vulnerable to claims the state may make on resources 
in communal areas.  
Basin Management Committees do not have any powers to make rules and enforce them. In 
essence, their functions are limited to facilitating the sustainable management of water resources 
in their basin areas and perform advisory functions with regard to water and land management 
issues (MAWRD/GTZ 2004: 7). Although the Water Resources Management Act requires Ba-
sin Management Committees to prepare water resources plans for their basins, these have to be 
submitted to the responsible Minister for consideration when developing a National Water Mas-
ter Plan. To the extent that this procedure facilitates a mechanism that allows the state to bal-
ance equity concerns with national objectives these provisions are reasonable. However, it must 
be assumed that such basin management plans will only acquire any legal status once the Minis-
ter has approved them.  
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4  Land and water rights  
 
4.1  Water rights and institutional framework 
Although policy documents on rural water supply regularly point out that the ownership of wa-
ter points is transferred to local communities of users, it is necessary to draw attention to the 
fact that ownership of water resources below and above the surface of the land in Namibia vests 
with the state. In the interest of improved service delivery to rural communities at lower budget-
ary costs to the state, it devolved the management of water points to the lowest level, that of 
water users. In practice this means that the state leases the facilities of rural water points and 
supply schemes to Water Point User Associations and local Water User Associations. Lease 
agreements lay down specific conditions of the lease and spell out each party’s technical and 
financial responsibilities with regard to the operation and maintenance of a water point or water 
scheme (MAWRD 2004: 31; MAWRD 1994: 1). Water policy and legislation thus do not trans-
fer full ownership rights of water points to local communities. However, the lease agreements 
confer significant powers to Water Point User Associations and local Water User Associations.  
The functions and powers of Water Point User Associations and Water Point Committees have 
been summarised in Werner (2007: 16–17). It will suffice therefore, to mention only a few per-
tinent points here.  
The Water Resources Management Act (Section 16(1) states that households using a particular 
water point for their water supply needs may form Water Point User Associations. Where a 
number of Water Point User Associations make use of a rural water supply scheme, i.e. pipe-
line, they are obliged to form local Water User Associations to co-ordinate the activities and 
management of water points. Rights to utilise a water point are open to all households who 
make regular use of a water point. However, these rights may be terminated by a Water Point 
User Association or a local Water User Association subject to the provisions of the Constitu-
tions of these institutions.  
Section 16(1) of the Act suggests that it is up to communities of water users to decide whether 
they want to establish a Water Point Users Association or not. However, Section 16(10) intro-
duces a measure of compulsion to form both kinds of associations under threat of having water 
points or rural water supply schemes concerned closed down by the Minister responsible for 
water affairs for failing to do so.  
Water Point User Associations and local Water User Associations have powers to make rules 
for the use of rural water supply schemes or water points by members and non-members. They 
also have powers to exclude people who do not comply with the rules from using a particular 
water point. In order to be able to this, the Water Resources Management Act requires that Wa-
ter Point User Associations and local Water User Associations develop and agree on Constitu-
tions. Once agreed to, Constitutions have to be submitted to the Minister responsible for water 
affairs for approval. Upon approval, Water Point User Associations/Water User Associations 
will be registered and become ‘legal person[s] with full capacity to sue and be sued in court, to 
contract and acquire rights and duties, and to own and dispose of properties’ (Section 16(9)).  
Members of Water Point User Associations must elect Water Point Committees. These consist 
of between 5 and 7 people. Women are represented in more or less equal numbers as men on 
Water Point Committees. The main responsibility of Water Point Committees is to see to the 
day-to-day management of a water point. This includes the maintenance of water points and 
ensuring that users make their payments for water. CuveWaters Papers, No. 5 
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Of particular interest to integrated water and land management is a provision in the Water Re-
sources Management Act that Water Point User Associations and local Water User Associations 
have ‘the power to plan and control the use of communal land in the immediate vicinity of the 
water point in co-operation with the communal land board and the traditional authority’ (Section 
19(e)). These powers are potentially significant in view of the fact that Section 19(e) of the Act 
is the only legal provision for communities to get involved in the management of communal 
grazing areas. As the next section will show, Communal Land Reform Act does not provide for 
such powers. 
 
4.2  Land rights and powers to manage land 
Formal legal ownership of land in non-freehold or communal areas vests in the state  
in trust for the benefit of traditional communities residing in those areas and for the 
purpose of promoting the economic and social development of the people in Na-
mibia, in particular the landless and those with insufficient access to land who are 
not in formal employment or engaged in non-agricultural business activities. 
The Communal Land Reform Act explicitly prohibits the granting of freehold rights to commu-
nal land. The nature and content of land rights in communal areas flow from this fundamental 
tenet of tenure reform in communal areas, which has two main objectives: 
1.  improving tenure security for customary land rights holders by introducing an obligation to 
have existing and new customary allocations of land for residential and cultivation purposes 
spatially defined and registered in a regional land register; and 
2.  introducing leasehold as a form of land tenure to encourage the commercial development of 
so-called unused communal land. 
The Communal Land Reform Act acknowledges that land rights in communal areas are gov-
erned by customary tenure regimes. In brief, this means that land rights are derived primarily 
from accepted membership of a group or social unit. Outsiders may join the group by way of 
specific mechanisms and procedures (Cousins 2007: 300). Traditionally, households obtained 
‘exclusive’ rights to residential and arable land, while grazing areas were utilised on a commu-
nal basis. Customary land rights usually last a lifetime and do not confer ownership but rather 
usufructory rights to the land. Powers to guarantee access to land, enforce customary land rights 
and regulate common pool resources vest in a hierarchical system of traditional authority. Many 
of these functions are located at the lowest level, namely the village headman, who allocate land 
to those who applied for it against a one off payment.  
Customary tenure in communal areas is widely regarded as insecure, although little evidence in 
support of this assumption has been produced. In addition, customary tenure has been character-
ised as ‘retarding progress of extending development facilities to communal areas’ and is asso-
ciated with land degradation (Minister Iivula-Ithana in Malan and Hinz 1997: 12, 131). While 
the factual accuracy of these statements can be debated, circumstantial evidence suggests that 
traditional authorities are increasingly unable to enforce customary tenure regimes. The increas-
ing integration of rural economies into the wider market based economy, a gradually rising 
population and a growing number of people pursuing their own personal enrichment have con-
spired to undermine traditional authority. The most prominent manifestation of this is the large 
scale enclosure of communal land for private use (Cox et al 1998).  
Against his background, the Communal Land Reform Act seeks to improve tenure security of 
customary land rights holders. In terms of the Act, existing customary land rights holders and al      
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new allocations are required to apply for these land rights to be certified and registered in land 
registers which Communal Land Boards are required to establish and maintain. This process 
requires that customary land holdings are spatially defined. Tenure security provided by the Act 
only applies to residential and arable land. Rights to communal grazing areas are not covered by 
the Act.  
The registration of customary land rights improves tenure security in so far as individual rights 
are protected against infringement by other individuals. However, the Communal Land Reform 
Act provides no protection of land rights against the state (Odendaal 2006: 25). This is a perti-
nent point in so far as the state has an interest in acquiring communal land for various purposes. 
As Odendaal has argued, the state will always be a party in land reform processes. To improve 
tenure security, the content of land rights such as the right to mortgage, for example, need to be 
defined in law, which must also provide some kind of protection against the state. Customary 
land rights, even if ill defined, are easy to protect when they are not challenged. Proper tenure 
security implies that customary land rights can be claimed and defended in terms of statutory 
legislation. Traditional authorities are only able protect land rights and solve land disputes if 
land rights holders recognise a common traditional authority. But they are ineffective in any 
disputes involving encroachments by the state or people who do not recognise the legitimacy of 
a traditional authority (Ibid: 26–27). 
The security of tenure provided for by the registration of land rights is further compromised if it 
is considered that the Act does not provide for downward accountability of traditional authori-
ties. The Act regulates the relationship between traditional authorities, Communal Land Boards 
and the state, but does not require traditional authorities to consult with their communities and 
obtain their consent where important decisions such as the demarcation or disposal of commu-
nal land are concerned. This lack of accountability potentially makes customary land rights 
holders vulnerable to losing access to land as a result of major commercial agricultural devel-
opments such as the Green Scheme or the surveying and fencing of communal land for agricul-
tural development. In both instances, the Act provides that ‘leasehold for agricultural purposes’ 
be granted. However, this requires that the Minister, after consultation with the respective tradi-
tional authority, must designate an area in each ‘communal area of a traditional community’ 
where leaseholds may be granted (Section 30(2), my emphasis). In terms of the Act, traditional 
authorities can take a decision without having to consult their subjects on the issue.  
 
4.2.1 Conservancies and community forests 
The principle of extending specific rights to communities of users has been implemented in the 
wildlife and forest sectors. The most common form this takes is rural conservancies and com-
munity forests. With regard to wildlife, legislation provides for the transfer of rights to con-
sumptive and non-consumptive use of wildlife in communal areas as well as the management 
thereof. Consumptive use is defined as 
The conditional ownership and use of game that can be hunted as trophies or for 
local consumption by conservancy members, cropped for commercial sale of meat, 
or captured and sold as live game (Davis 2004: 16).  
Non-consumptive  rights  enable  communities  to  establish  tourism  enterprises  (Ibid).  In  both 
instances do communities enjoy the material benefits of these rights. While registered members 
of conservancies have rights to manage wildlife and natural resources, they have no rights to the 
land itself (Odendaal 2006: 32).  CuveWaters Papers, No. 5 
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The Nature Conservation Amendment Act of 1996 provides for the establishment of a legal 
entity known as a conservancy to apply for and exercise the rights to wildlife. Any community 
living on communal land can apply to the Minister of Environment and Tourism to establish a 
conservancy. However, communities have to fulfil certain requirements before registration and 
subsequent transfer of rights and responsibilities occurs. These include the following: 
·  the community must elect a representative committee and supply the names of the commit-
tee members; 
·  the community must a agree to a legal constitution which provides for the sustainable man-
agement of game in the conservancy; and 
·  the community must define the boundaries of the geographic area of the conservancy (Jones 
and Kakujaha 2006: 12). 
In addition, the community must have the ability to manage funds and have an approved method 
for distributing benefits derived from the use of wildlife to its members (Ibid).  
It has been the policy intention that registered conservancies should develop management plans 
for their conservancies. A policy document prepared on land-use planning by the Ministry of 
Environment and Tourism in 1994 laid down some principles in this regard. It stated that the 
success of any development project rested ‘on the extent to which local communities have par-
ticipated in the planning of land use and have real decision making power’. More specifically, 
appropriate institutions were required to take decision on land use and the use of other natural 
resources. They should have jurisdiction within a geographically defined area and should decide 
on land and resource allocation and utilisation (Ministry of Environment and Tourism 1994: 2, 
3, 5).  
Jones and Corbett (2000: 23) noted that officials were demanding management plans before 
quotas for trophy hunting and own use would be issued. However, while conservancies could 
undertake land-use planning and zoning of land within a conservancy for specific purposes, they 
had no legal powers to enforce such plans (Long 2004: 34–35). The Communal Land Reform 
Act also does not provide communities with such powers.  
The Forestry Act of 2001 follows a model similar to conservancies to transfer management and 
use rights to communities in the form of community forests, but differs in some important as-
pects from legislation governing conservancies. To start with, the Act does not appear to pro-
vide for communities living in and/or close to forests to apply for establishing a community 
forest. Instead, the responsible Minister may, with the consent of the chief or traditional author-
ity or any other body authorised to allocate land in communal areas, enter into an agreement 
with anybody the Minister believes reasonable represents the interests of that community and is 
willing to and able to manage communal land as a community forest (Jones and Kakujaha-
Matundu 2006: 12). While the Act does not require community forests to have constitutions like 
conservancies, the Community Forest Guidelines suggest that a community forest management 
body needs to develop a constitution as part of its establishment. An integral part of any agree-
ment is a management plan for a proposed community forest. Amongst other things, the man-
agement plan will spell out rights and obligations of communities with regard to the community 
forest (Ibid: 12–13). It must include an assessment of land use, wildlife, water resources and 
livestock farming as well as management plans for water and livestock (Corbett 2002: 36). The 
management authority of a community forest may permit the grazing of animals and other agri-
cultural activities in a community forest Ibid: 40–41).  
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4.3  Group rights to land 
As the discussion has shown, granting property rights to natural resources to communities is 
highly uneven. This has led Bollig and Corbett (n.d.: 74–75) to argue that 
in a sense things are happening back to front by communities getting statutorily en-
forceable common property rights to resources on their land without having any 
such security to the land on which the resources are situated.  
They concluded from this that ‘the ultimate goal would be to obtain registered rights to land on 
which [resource] rights occur’ and observe that government has been hesitant to consider group 
tenure as a tenure option ‘on the mistaken belief that any such recognition would encourage the 
development of ethnically exclusive along the lines of Bantustans’ (Ibid: 76). 
Government’s unwillingness at present to consider granting land rights to groups of users was 
highlighted during a National Stakeholders Conference on land issues which was held 1995. 
The purpose of the meeting was to review the Communal Land Reform Act with a view to pro-
pose possible amendments. The issue of group rights to communal land was also discussed. The 
20  proposals  for  amendments that  were  rejected  included  that ‘customary  land  rights  users 
committee[s] be established in communal areas to manage grazing areas’; the establishment of 
Land Administration Committees to consider applications and give consent for applications for 
customary land rights in areas with no recognised chiefs; and to ‘amend the Act to allow for 
grassroots Commonage Land Users Association that will be in charge of the day to day man-
agement of the commonage. Commonage Land User Associations will be more or less like a 
water point committee or a conservancy’ (Ministry of Lands and Resettlement 2005a: 21–22).  
The decision by conference participants to reject these proposals aimed at establishing property 
rights to land and natural resources to groups of users seems to be at odds with the National 
Land Policy, which includes ‘legally constituted bodies as institutions to exercise joint owner-
ship rights’ as a category of land rights holder (Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilita-
tion 1998: 3). Moreover, the principle to grant land rights to groups was approved by Cabinet in 
the form of the Final Draft Land Tenure Policy of 2005 (Ministry of Lands and Resettlement: 
2005d: 9). At the time of writing it still had not been submitted to the National Assembly.  
The Draft Policy proposes that the boundaries of traditional villages be demarcated by Commu-
nal Land Boards in conjunction with recognised traditional leaders. Once this has been com-
pleted and a village constitution drawn up, ‘the village would be registered and the effect of such 
registration should be that the village becomes a juristic person in order to give better security to 
the land tenure of village members’. The Draft Policy proposes to establish registers of ‘rightful 
members of the village community’ who ‘will be given formal rights over land and all resources 
in each village’. Rightful residents will also have the right to accept or reject a person who 
wishes to enter the community (Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation 2005b: 17). 
Parallel to the Draft Land Tenure Policy of 2005 the Permanent Technical Team on Land Re-
form also recommended that ‘village development committees and land use associations’ be 
established to act as advisory bodies on land use and land allocations to traditional authorities 
(Ministry of Lands and Resettlement 2005c: 38). Cabinet, after considering the Report of the 
Permanent Technical Team, approved a recommendation made by the PTT ‘that community-
based policies on resource management are expanded beyond wildlife and tourism to incorpo-
rate other natural resources like water, land and land-based economic activities’ (Republic of 
Namibia 2006: 3).  CuveWaters Papers, No. 5 
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The discussion suggests strongly that government is ambivalent with regard to granting groups 
rights to land. While the highest political level appears to have approved in principle the intro-
duction of group rights to land, there appears to be resistance at the lower, administrative level. 
A possible explanation for this ambivalence is that the political impact of group rights to land 
on the existing power structures in communal areas is uncertain. Extending property rights to 
land to groups vests them with all the powers associated with controlling access to land. These 
powers have to be taken away from someone else, in this case traditional authorities. Chiari 
(2004: 20) has argued that one of the reasons why the state is not willing to effect such transfer 
of property rights to the local level has to be sought in the political importance of traditional 
leaders in the north-central regions. It is from these regions that SWAPO continues to draw 
major political support. ‘The loyalty of traditional authorities is obviously crucial … (Ibid). 
 
4.4  Land use planning 
Integrated land use planning will be an important tool to bring about integrated land and water 
management. At present, National Development Plans are the main planning tool for socio-
economic development. However, these do ‘not necessarily take into account spatial develop-
ment in terms of present and future land use options to meet the objectives of sustainable devel-
opment’ (IDC 2002: 3). The explanation for this may be the fact that the status of land use plans 
is not clear in policy and legislation.  
By dint of its mandate ‘to be the custodian of Namibian land’ (Ministry of Lands and Resettle-
ment 2007: 6) the central responsibility for producing national land use plans rests with the 
Ministry of Lands and Resettlement. The Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act of 1995 
spells out very clearly what the functions of land use planning are in terms of freehold land ac-
quired for redistribution. There are no similar provisions in law applying to communal areas. In 
addition, there is no approved policy on land use planning as yet. In 2002 a Draft National Land 
Use Planning Policy was prepared and submitted to the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement but 
does not appear to have been approved.  
At the sub-national level, Regional Councils are the only institutions that have a clear legal 
mandate to produce development plans for their regions, including communal areas. In terms of 
the Regional Councils Act of 1992, regional development plans must take into account the 
physical, social and economic characteristics, urbanisation patterns, natural resources, economic 
development potential, infrastructure, land utilisation patterns and sensitivity of the natural envi-
ronment’ (Ibid, Annexure A: 1–2).  
Despite the absence of a national policy and legal provisions governing land use planning, the 
Division of Land Use Planning in the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement has produced Re-
gional Integrated Land Use Plans for 8 of the 13 regions. Included are land use plans for Oshi-
koto, Ohangwena, Omusati and Oshana (Ministry of Lands and Resettlement 2007: 4). Inte-
grated land use plans thus exist for the entire Etosha Basin. However, ‘none of these plans can 
… be legally enforced in terms of existing legislation and were/are merely guidelines for spatial 
development, proposed land use options or budgetary purposes’ (IDC 2002: 4). For reasons that 
could not be established, existing land use plans are not known outside the Ministry of Lands 
and Resettlement. 
The National Land Policy proposed to establish a Land Use and Environmental Board (LUEB) 
to ensure that all land use planning; land administration, land development and environmental 
protection are co-ordinated on a national and regional basis (Ministry of Lands, Resettlement      
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and Rehabilitation 1998: 16). This does not appear to have happened. Instead, an Environmental 
Management Bill has been submitted to the National Assembly in 2007. Amongst other things, 
it proposes to establish an Environmental Development Commission to oversee that the princi-
ples of sustainable land use planning are adhered to (IDC 2002 Annexure A: 7). The Commis-
sion will promote co-operation and co-ordination of all planning activities, and every regional 
land use plan will have to be submitted to it so that the environmental implications thereof can 
be assessed (Ibid).  
The importance of local level participation in land use planning and real decision making pow-
ers at that level have been identified as a key to successful implementation of development pro-
jects (Ministry of Environment and Tourism 1994: 2). For this to happen, appropriate institu-
tions need to be established with jurisdiction within a geographically defined area’ (Ibid: 5). To 
date, the only local level institutions with legal status are Water Point User Association and 
local Water User Associations. These institutions have limited powers to carry out land use 
planning in the vicinity of their water points. However, as a result of the absence of a clear pol-
icy and legal framework that provides for local level, participatory land use planning, there is a 
risk that local level land use plans will not be recognised by government institutions. This may 
make enforcement of land use plans difficult. However, attempts should be made to initiate 
participatory, local level land use planning with water user associations on a pilot basis. 
 
4.5  Communal Land Boards 
In view of the growing urgency to enforce sustainable water and land management, there is a 
widespread expectation that Communal Land Boards will play that role. During a basin man-
agement planning workshop in 2004 the view was expressed that Land Boards and settlement 
initiatives need to integrate the issue of sustainable water use into their decision-making process 
(MAWRD/GTZ 2004: 7). International Development Consultancy (2002: 4) stated that Com-
munal Land Boards in collaboration with Traditional Authorities ‘will have a profound influ-
ence on what type of land use and in which manner it is exercised in communal areas. They will 
largely be able to control resource management and farm productivity’. The National Land Pol-
icy proposed that Communal Land Boards should be able to cancel ‘a title’ after consulting the 
Land Use and Environmental Board if the land rights holder does not use the land in a sustain-
able manner or inflicts environmental damage (Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilita-
tion 1998: 16).  
Communal land Boards are the only decentralised land administration structures provided for in 
law. It is therefore understandable that institutions which are involved with integrated water and 
land management expect Communal Land Boards to play a central role in ensuring that land and 
water is used in a sustainable manner. Considerable efforts have gone into making recommenda-
tions on how to assist Communal Land Boards to make environmentally sound decisions (Jones 
and Kakujaha 2006). On the basis of this a training manual has been developed and the training 
of members of Communal Land Boards is ongoing (Republic of Namibia 2007).  
However, despite these expectations, Communal Land Boards do not have any direct legal pow-
ers or responsibilities to consider wider environmental issues in ratifying the allocation of cus-
tomary land rights (Jones and Kakujaha 2006: 10).  CuveWaters Papers, No. 5 
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The roles and functions of Communal Land Boards are considerably narrower than is com-
monly thought. These can be summarised as follows: 
·  Exercise control over the allocation and cancellation of customary land rights 
·  Consider and decide on applications for a right of leasehold 
·  Establish and maintain a land register for customary land rights and leasehold rights  
·  Advise the minister (Republic of Namibia 2007:17) 
Communal Land Boards therefore have no powers to allocate land. This function remains in the 
hands of traditional authorities. In exercising their powers to control customary allocations, the 
Regulations to the Communal Land Reform Act provide some criteria that need to be consid-
ered when ratifying allocations. These include limitations on the size of land applied for and the 
numbers of livestock that any lawful resident may graze on communal land. With regard to the 
former, the regulations stipulate that a livestock owner may not graze more than 300 large stock 
or 1,800 small stock on the commonage of a communal area. Customary land rights may also 
not exceed an area of 20 hectares.  
The powers of Communal Land Boards are equally limited with regard to the development of 
‘unutilised’ communal land for agricultural purposes. Although the Communal Land Reform 
Act provides Communal Land Boards with the powers to survey any area of communal land and 
cause diagrams and plans to be prepared, this can only happen with the approval of the Minister 
(Section 41). Put differently: Communal Land Boards administer decisions taken about land use 
at higher political level. They do not have any powers to make such decisions. Their jurisdiction 
is further curtailed by provisions in the regulations that they may grant leaseholds only to areas 
not  exceeding  50 hectares.  Applications for  larger  areas  must  be approved  by  the  Minister 
(Regulation 13). It would therefore appear that Communal Land Boards have no jurisdiction 
with regard to the development of communal land for agricultural purposes.  
 
 
5  The role of traditional authorities in water and land management  
 
5.1  Issues of legitimacy 
The impact of new institutions in the water and land sectors is dependent on the degree of le-
gitimacy these new institutions can acquire vis a vis other sources of legitimacy such as tradi-
tional leaders (Toulmin 2000: 232). That this is a highly contested issue was shown in the proc-
ess of developing the Communal Land Reform Act. 
The first draft of the Communal Land Reforms Act provided for the vesting of communal lands 
in Land Boards, very similar to the situation in Botswana. Communal Land Boards were to be 
given far reaching powers to grant rights for the occupation and use of land as well as the cancel-
lation of such rights. In addition, such Land Boards would have been empowered to impose con-
ditions or restrictions for the occupation and use of land under customary rights (Malan and Hinz 
1997: 177). However, these rights could be transferred to traditional authorities (Ibid: 183).  
Chiefs and traditional leaders were not permitted to be members of Land Boards Members of 
Land Boards were to be appointed by the responsible Minister. Land Boards were also to be 
empowered to hear appeals against decisions taken by traditional leaders (Ibid: 176–177).      
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The proposed new Act was presented to a conference on communal land administration in 1996. 
Participants were traditional authorities from all over the country. The majority of these per-
ceived the provisions  of  the  Bill  to undermine  their  authority. Traditional  leaders  from  the 
north-central regions, for example, objected to the proposals in the Bill that Land Boards would 
take over all land administration in communal areas, thus relegating traditional leaders to mere 
advisors of Land Boards with no executive powers. They stated that ‘Traditional Leaders should 
not be made to be (sic) back-yard boys of what should be technical and advisory bodies, namely 
the Regional Land Boards’ (in Malan and Hinz 1997: 69). In their views, it was wrong to vest 
envisaged Land Boards with power to  
exercise control over the occupation and use of communal lands. Instead, the Re-
gional Land Boards should be advisory bodies whose primary function is to assist 
the Traditional Leaders to come up with rational, transparent, fair and, where pos-
sible, uniform procedures of land allocation and utilisation in the communal areas 
(Ibid: 68–69).  
They based their arguments on the legitimacy traditional leaders enjoyed on account of their 
long standing responsibilities. 
In view of such opposition, which was shared by many traditional leaders from other regions, 
the Bill was amended. The result was that the Communal Land Reform Act in its present form 
retains and in some respects increases the roles of traditional leaders in land administration in 
communal areas.  
Despite this, the perception persists among some Traditional Leaders that government policy is 
designed to reduce their powers. In 2007 the Chief of Uukwaluudhi expressed his concerns about 
whether Traditional Leaders or politicians were in control of communal land. Although he ac-
knowledged that Traditional Leaders continued to allocate communal land, he was of the opinion 
that politicians were busy reducing the powers of Traditional Authorities (Werner 2008: 15).  
A critical analysis of the fundamental thrust of land policy in communal areas suggests that these 
perceptions are not far off the mark, if it is considered that the Communal Land Reform Act pro-
vides for the alienation of communal land for allocation to small-scale commercial farmers under 
long-term leasehold tenure. The net effect of this is that the areas of jurisdiction of Chiefs and 
consequently their main source of power will be gradually reduced. Leasehold implies that cus-
tomary law no longer applies, and Traditional Leaders consequently have no more power over 
such land rights. 
The process of demarcating communal land for agricultural development is at an advanced 
stage. In early 2007 altogether 721 farms were surveyed in the northern communal areas (Minis-
try of Lands and Resettlement 2007: 4). The sizes of surveyed farms range between 2,000 ha in 
Caprivi and 2,500 ha in Kavango (Schuh et al 2006: 20). There appears to be no official guide-
lines on how these farms will be allocated, save to say that future beneficiaries are expected to 
farm independently on a commercial basis. They are therefore required to have previous farm-
ing experience as well as the capacity to meet possible financial obligations. In Omusati, tradi-
tional leaders were hesitant to make any land available for fencing while no land was available 
in Oshana Region. An important factor in this regard was the fact that the fencing of land would 
preclude people from other parts of the regions with no grazing to continue utilising pastures on 
a communal grazing. Put differently: the fencing programme would deny many people access to 
grazing and leave them with no alternatives. CuveWaters Papers, No. 5 
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The situation in Oshikoto Region is complicated by the fact that large-scale unauthorised fenc-
ing has occurred since the 1980s. Invariably, this process started when powerful individuals 
privatised boreholes that were sunk by government as part of drought relief (See Cox et al 
1998). The full extent of unauthorised fencing is still not known, but it is believed that large 
tracts of land particularly in eastern Oshikoto Region have been effectively privatised in this 
way. A major concern is to survey these enclosures and bring their sizes in line with national 
policy (Schuh et al: 21) 
The negative impact of enclosures of communal land on transhumance patterns has been dem-
onstrated for Oshikoto Region (Cox et al 1989). The single most important negative impact of 
fences is that they restrict the mobility of livestock herds in search of seasonal grazing and wa-
ter. As much of the land that was surveyed in recent years is located in areas with no existing 
water points, new water points must be developed in order enable people to farm. It must be 
assumed that these water points will be owned and managed by beneficiaries of this programme. 
No evidence was found that social and ecological impact studies were carried out prior to sur-
veying communal land for commercial agricultural development. It is also unlikely that any 
monitoring of this programme is taking place, partly because it has not become fully opera-
tional. 
Traditional Leaders appear to have accepted the introduction of property rights to water and 
wildlife without much resistance. Fundamental to this difference is that powers to control access 
to land, rather than water or wildlife, continue to be the source of power of Traditional Leaders. 
The ownership of water points does not impact on the powers of traditional leaders and in par-
ticular village headmen to allocate and cancel customary land rights. The same argument applies 
to the establishment of conservancies, where linkages and collaboration with traditional authori-
ties are regarded as beneficial. Where conservancies ‘function in terms of operating guidelines 
based on customary law principles of resource management buttressed by both the Traditional 
Authorities Act and natural resources legislation’ the need to establish themselves as a legal 
bodies is obviated (Corbett and Jones 2000: 12–13). 
The broad acceptance by traditional leaders of the principle that communities ‘own’ their water 
points provides a potential opportunity to develop the legal mandate of local level water institu-
tions with regard to land management towards a more integrated approach. This will require a 
carefully planned strategy of developing such an approach together with traditional leaders at 
local and higher levels.  
Moreover, the careful preparation of the process of transferring management responsibilities 
regarding water points contributed to the general legitimacy of the approach. Preparations in-
cluded widespread consultations with a variety of stakeholders. Strategy papers were prepared 
and discussed at workshops in all regions. Whether the non-payment of water by many people 
in the region can be interpreted as a sign of resistance is a moot point. The reason for non-
payment is not only poverty. Available information suggests that many people who are able to 
pay simply refuse. While the reasons for this are not well researched, this could be interpreted as 
a way of negating the legitimacy not so much about the institutions involved as of the principle 
to have to pay for water delivery. 
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5.2  Land allocation and administration 
Despite perceptions that the Communal Land Reform Act will gradually reduce the powers of 
traditional authorities, it acknowledges and buttresses the central role of traditional authorities in 
land administration in communal areas. The allocation and cancellation of customary land rights 
remains the responsibility of traditional authorities. Where people apply for leaseholds, Com-
munal Land Boards can only grant these with the consent of the traditional authority concerned. 
The consent of traditional authorities is also required to demarcate communal land for agricul-
tural development purposes.  
The Communal Land Reform Act also provides traditional authorities with powers to manage 
commonages and impose conditions on the use of communal grazing areas. These include the 
kinds and numbers of livestock that may be grazed and the section of the area under their juris-
diction which may be grazed, i.e. they may introduce rotational grazing. Should land rights 
holders not observe these conditions, a Chief or traditional authority may cancel their rights. 
The same sanctions apply if a land right holder engages in the following activities without the 
written consent of the traditional authority and ratified by the Communal Land Board: 
·  erects or occupies any building or structure on a commonage 
·  ploughs or cultivates any portion of the commonage 
·  obstructs the ways to any watering place on the commonage, or somehow interferes with the 
use of watering places or damages them 
·  does something other than lawful grazing on the commonage that prevents or restricts the 
other residents’ rights to grazing (Legal Assistance Centre 2003: 20–21).  
Moreover, customary land rights may also be cancelled if ‘the land is being used predominantly 
for a purpose not recognised under customary law’ (Section 27(1)(b)). In addition, the Regula-
tions empower the Chief, traditional authority and/or Communal Land Board to cancel the land 
rights of a person who utilises land in such a manner that it causes soil erosion.
1 Land rights 
holders are also compelled to manage their land in accordance with accepted farming practices 
in the area concerned, but have to comply with provisions of the Soil Conservation Act of 1969 
and any requirements of the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry. But the Regulations 
do not specify any sanctions for transgressing these general provisions and do not place any 
authority on either Communal Land Boards or traditional authorities to enforce them (Jones and 
Kakujaha 2006: 11). 
Finally, the Operational Manual for Communal Land Boards states that in checking applications 
for existing or new customary land rights, traditional authorities have to ascertain whether loca-
tion of the proposed land use is in conformity with the zoning of the area (Ministry of Lands 
and Resettlement 2006: 23). Needless to say, this not only presupposes the existence of land use 
plans, but also that they are known and understood at the local level. 
Of particular interest are provisions in the Regulations to the Communal Land Reform Act that 
give Chiefs and Traditional Authorities the power to protect access to water. In terms of Regula-
tion 33(2) it is an offence to obstruct approaches to watering places on the commonage or pre-
vent a person from drawing water from or water livestock at such a watering place; pollute wa-
ter at a watering place or interfere with the operation of a windmill, water pump, water pipe, 
                                                       
1   It is interesting that the Soil Conservation Act of 1969 is invoked in this regard. Although a very appropri-
ate piece of legislation regarding the conservation of soil, it has all but disappeared from public memory 
after Independence (See de Klerk 2004: 207). CuveWaters Papers, No. 5 
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dam or storage tank or other installation at a watering place. Contravention of any of regulation 
is a criminal offence, punishable with a fine not exceeding N$ 4,000 or imprisonment of up to 
one year (Legal Assistance Centre 2003). 
 
5.3  Nested institutions 
In general policies on land and natural resources refer to traditional authorities in a generic 
sense. It is important to recognise, however, that control over land and natural resources ‘is of-
ten located within a hierarchy of nested systems of authority’ (Cousins 2004: 293). In the north-
central regions, traditional authorities generally consist of three tiers: the Chief or King, a num-
ber of Councillors and at the lowest level, village headmen. Each level has distinct functions 
and powers with regard to land and water. These may differ slightly from one area of jurisdic-
tion to another. The following discussion, therefore, does not claim to be representative of all 
areas, but serves to illustrate the point.  
All land in a traditional community falls under the jurisdiction of a Chief or King. He/she pre-
sides over the tribal council consisting of a number of Senior Headmen or omalenga enene, 
ranging between 8 and 10 in number. Each Senior Headman is in charge of a district. Where 
such districts were too big, they were divided into sub-districts which are headed by junior 
headmen. Senior Headmen allocated villages or omikunda to persons who could afford to pay 
for this right. The ‘buyers’ of a village subsequently became headmen of these villages. Head-
men in turn allocated land to individual households against payment of a fee (Hinz 1995: 30–31, 
Kerven 1998: 68).  
Most functions concerning land administration continue to be handled by village headmen. Un-
der customary law it was not permitted to claim land for residential and cultivation purposes 
without the permission of the village headman (Hinz 2003: 63). Hinz (1995: 32) described the 
process of acquiring land rights as follows:  
After identifying the land for which one is to apply, the applicant approaches the 
responsible headman who will then in turn with his/her assistants and the applicant 
inspect the piece wanted. If the land is available, the boundaries and the price will 
be fixed. If the applicant accepts, he/she will inform the headman and the payment 
agreed upon will be made.  
If the occupant intends to change the boundary fence of his homestead, he/she has to consult the 
headman (Hinz 2003: 62).  
The laws of  the  Uukwambi Traditional  Authority  state  that  companies  wanting  land in  the 
communal area also have to request permission from the village headman (Ibid). 
Recent research (Werner 2008) suggests that women are entitled to apply for land in their own 
rights. However, a number of traditional beliefs and perceptions make this difficult. By tradi-
tion, it was only married men who applied for land to establish his homestead. However, as 
more women generate their own incomes they can afford to pay for a customary allocation. 
They are further encouraged to do so by the gender equality provisions of the Communal Land 
Reform Act. 
The extent of controlling access to grazing land is not entirely clear. In the Ondonga area King 
Eliphas stated that ‘any community member can go and graze his or her cattle’. His definition of 
community included people from Ongandjera, Oukwanyama and Kavango. There were also no 
limits on the number of animals individuals could graze (Hinz 2003: 60).       
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The situation in Uukwambi differed slightly from the Ndonga area. Chief Ipumbu of the Uuk-
wambi Traditional Authority stated that everybody, regardless of area of origin, had a right to 
graze cattle on the commonage, provided he/she had the permission of the responsible headman. 
However, people who do not originate from Uukwaludhi had to obtain the permission from the 
King. The decision on whether to grant such permission or not depended on the availability of 
water and grazing (Ibid: 65, 67). 
Applications for land rights for purposes other than residential or cultivation have to be decided 
by the Council of Senior Headmen in the Oukwanyama area (Hinz 1995: 32–33). This included 
the issue of fencing communal land for private use. In the 1980s individuals could apply to a 
Senior Headman to fence of land in the sparsely populated parts of eastern Oshikoto. The Senior 
Headman submitted the application to the King and his Council. The King caused an inspection 
of land to be carried out and the boundaries established. Before approving an application the, 
the Council had to ascertain that the applicant was a Namibian citizen with a good character and 
no criminal record and that he did not have any fenced land elsewhere (Werner 1998: 38).  
Regulations formulated in customary laws regarding water appear to be in conflict with water 
legislation and the powers of Water User Associations and Water Point Associations. The Laws 
of Ondonga, for example, permit people to ‘drill’ wells, provided they have entered into an 
agreement with the headman. If somebody ‘establish[es]’ a well without such agreement, the 
well will become the property of the headman (Laws 1994: 68–69). The customary laws of 
Uukwambi state that ‘the Traditional Authority feels a strong responsibility to protect water’ 
and place the responsibility to protect water in wards in the hands of headmen. Cases of ‘water 
vandalism’ are regarded as a punishable offence and have to be reported to the headman (Hinz 
2003: 63).  
The Communal Land Reform Act recognises only registered Chiefs and traditional authorities 
as defined in the Traditional Authorities Act of 2000 as executive authorities with regard to 
communal land management. The most important institution in customary land administration, 
village headmen, is not considered in the Act. Their functions and powers are not defined, de-
spite the fact that they are responsible for allocations and cancellation of customary land rights 
and continue to be the main dispute resolution institution at local level. This also explains why 
the Act has prohibited the tradition of paying headmen for allocations of land. These payments 
are the main source of income for village headmen and the only compensation for performing 
land administration functions at village level. Recent research suggests that in some instances 
village headmen have become indifferent towards their traditional functions on account of non-
payment (Werner, forthcoming). Some Communal Land Boards in the north-central regions have 
lobbied government to revise the prohibition to enable village headmen to obtain some income.  
The effect of the Communal Land Reform Act appears to shift the balance of power away from 
individuals and households and local authority structures to the traditional authority and the 
Minister. One can conclude with Cousins and Claasens (2004: 290) that if push comes to shove, 
‘ownership at the level of the traditional council/ chieftaincy will “trump” the rights that exist at 
lower levels, such as household and individual rights to residential and arable land’.  
 
5.4  Water institutions as basis of community based natural resources management 
However, despite the partial and erratic empowerment of rural communities, each acknowl-
edgement and enhancement of local level institutions in law or in practice opens windows of 
opportunity to influence the use and control of resources (Wiley 2000b: 2). Conservancies, for CuveWaters Papers, No. 5 
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example, have provided an ‘impetus for the full recognition of communal tenure to land itself’ 
(Bollig and Corbett n.d.: 75). It was reported that in the absence of clear legal rights to com-
monages, the establishment of conservancies was regarded by many traditional leaders and local 
communities as a mechanism to stake out territorial claims to communal grazing areas, facilitat-
ing their active participation (Corbett and Jones 2000: 7).  
The argument also applies to local institutions in the water sector. Recognising Water Point 
User Associations and Water Point Associations as legal entities provides them with a basis that 
could serve as a basis for managing resources outside the water sector.  
That this is not simply a theoretical possibility is illustrated by the case of the village of Okon-
yoka in the Aminuis communal area.
2 The village was founded by a few Herero households who 
moved there in 1959 in search of water and grazing. The area was used primarily for grazing 
with only seasonal water available. After the sinking of boreholes, permanent settlement became 
possible and in 1999 Okonyoka was a village of approximately 150 people. Drought is endemic 
in the area and government subsidies became a major coping mechanism for drought years. 
They enabled farmers to keep their livestock during droughts, contributing to increased live-
stock numbers. In addition, communities increasingly placed restrictions on livestock move-
ments. These factors encouraged a trend to secure exclusive grazing rights by individuals and 
groups for droughts and dry seasons.  
Against  the  background  of  changed  drought-coping  strategies, the establishment  of  a  water 
point committee ‘provide[d] a forum for community discussions of natural resource issues and 
decisions regarding access to rangeland grazing resources, especially during times of drought’ 
(Twyman et al 2002: 132). At Okonyoka the water point committee quickly took on wider re-
sponsibilities such as regulating access to village pastures for emergency grazing. A system of 
considering  applications  for  emergency  grazing  and  laying  down  specific  conditions  under 
which it was granted was established.  
The water point committee faced serious challenges in enforcing their decisions. The drilling of 
new boreholes in the mid-1990s on land considered to be part of Okonyoka village attracted 
new settlers and put increased pressures on grazing. After one new settler fenced off a paddock 
on land considered to belong to Okonyoka, the community decided to fence off their village 
land. The youth in particular felt that a fence was needed to protect their resources and the issue 
of constructing a community fence was discussed through the water point committee. After 
having reached agreement, the community spent a year negotiating the boundaries of Okonyoka 
with neighbouring villages. The entry point in each village was the water point committee. Once 
agreement was reached, the construction of the fence was started in 1998. 
Erecting a community fence had a number of social and environmental implications which will 
not be discussed here. Suffice to conclude therefore, that 
This fencing scheme represents a clear manifestation of community empowerment 
caused by a range of both external pressures and internal community issues similar 
to those faced at other settlements in Namibia (Ibid: 133). 
The community fence boosted the confidence of the community to manage their own resources. 
They were contemplating to apply for conservancy status to formalise their rights to land.  
The impact of the community fence on individual households in Okonyoka has been positive. 
Active participation in the water point committee has increased community control over re-
                                                       
2   The following discussion is based on Twyman et al 2002 unless otherwise stated.      
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sources and livelihoods. However, the process impacted negatively on access to land by mar-
ginal groups. Large numbers of people are likely to become landless if more villages resort to 
fencing their land. The formalisation of procedures for granting emergency grazing to outsiders 
in years of drought may also impact negatively on traditional drought-coping strategies, which 
are based on mobility.  
A set of specific local conditions gave rise to the utilisation of water point committees to ad-
vance the interests of the community at Okonyoka. Conditions in the north-central regions differ 
in some significant aspects, however. In particular, the central role of traditional authorities in 
controlling access to land and the widespread legitimacy they continue to enjoy (Hinz 2003: 49–
50) is likely to limit the possibilities of similar developments. Moreover, with approximately 
half the population not owning cattle or other livestock, pressures to fence village land may not 
be the same. 
Despite these caveats, the possibility does exist for Water User Associations and Water Point 
Associations to assume wider powers in community based natural resources management. Al-
though no information exists on the issue, it is conceivable that villages depend entirely on 
piped water. In such cases, local Water User Associations will consist of all households of the 
village, and their areas of jurisdiction will coincide with that of the village headmen. 
Even if Water Point User Associations or local Water User Associations were to use the powers 
provided for in the Water Resources Management Act, they would encounter some intractable 
problems. To start with, defining the geographical area in the vicinity of a water point or water 
scheme is difficult. Identifying the community of regular users of a water point or water scheme 
is relatively simple. However, the regular users of a water point may not necessarily coincide 
with the people who use parts of the grazing land around a water point but who do not regularly 
draw water at the water point. Access to open water during the rainy season makes it possible 
for people to take their livestock into areas far away from home. Such water is open to anybody 
without restriction, the proverbial open access situation. Moreover, hand dug wells play a sig-
nificant part in water provision in parts of north-central. These are also not governed by the 
Water Resources Management Act. Traditionally, such wells are owned by the person or per-
sons who dug them. By virtue of such ownership, they control access to water.  
Access to water is a precondition for having access to grazing. Without water, the best grazing 
cannot be utilised. Water user associations therefore potentially have a key role in controlling 
access to grazing. At present access to water and hence grazing is guaranteed for as long people 
pay for their water consumption. Water user associations and their water point committees do 
not appear to make use of their legal powers to plan and control communal land in the vicinity 
of their water points. Water user associations should be encouraged to make more use of their 
legal powers to manage land and water in an integrated fashion. A useful start in this direction 
would be to initiate a process of participatory land use planning. This is not likely to introduce 
any radical departures from existing land uses, but is likely to facilitate more sustainable land 
and water use. Moreover, by involving communities in the process, the final land and water 
management plan will enjoy wider legitimacy than a top down approach. The methodology 
adopted by conservancies to develop management plans will be very useful in this regard. While 
water user associations are legally constituted bodies with legally defined powers, it will be 
essential to start participatory land use planning in close consultation with traditional leaders. 
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5.5  Development of water infrastructure 
Water policy and legislation deals explicitly with the devolution of management powers to local 
water institutions. The powers of these institutions with regard to the development of water 
infrastructure are less clear. The distinction between management and development is impor-
tant, in so far as the former involves already existing water sources and includes pricing and 
supervision of allocation. Water development, on the other hand, entails raising funds often 
from external sources for new water points and for establishing programmes for water delivery. 
The single biggest concern of households in rural areas is the need to have more water sources 
developed closer to their homes (Peters 2002: 10).  
It must be assumed that proposed water abstractions and new water developments by different 
user associations acting as legal entities are governed by the stipulations of the Water Resources 
Management Act as it applies to all other persons. These appear to deal primarily with the ab-
straction of water, but not with the introduction of technologies such as small-scale desalination 
plants, which are designed to decrease the dependence on sub-terranean water. 
The abstraction of any water including brackish and marine water requires a license from the 
responsible minister. The application for such a license must include a description of the water-
works necessary to accomplish the proposed abstraction and treatment that will be given to the 
abstracted water. An impact assessment of the proposed abstraction of water on the environment 
and existing water users and water resources must accompany the application (Section 33). An 
application is then forwarded to the Basin Management Committee for investigation and rec-
ommendation.  
The Act sets out a number of criteria which must be considered before approval of a license is 
granted. Apart from applications having to be consistent with the Water Master Plans, criteria 
include aspects of safe yields of aquifers from which water is abstracted, efficient and beneficial 
use of water and the impact on water users and water resources. The need to redress the effects 
of past racial and gender discrimination will also be considered, as well as the existence of tradi-
tional communities which may depend on the water resource to which an application for a li-
cense is made (Section 35). 
The drilling, enlargement or construction of boreholes can only happen once a permit to do so 
has been acquired from the Minister concerned. Applications are checked to ensure what the 
safe yield of an aquifer is and that the proposed use of the water is in conformity with efficient 
water management practices. 
In both instances – licenses to abstract water and permits to drill boreholes – the existence of 
any customary rights and practices in or dependent on the water resource to which the license or 
application relates must be considered. Licenses to abstract water are issued subject to the pro-
tection of existing and potential uses of the water resource, including uses by virtue of custom-
ary rights and practices (Sections 35, 37). Where basin management committees exist, applica-
tions for a license to abstract and use water must be submitted to the committee for investigation 
and recommendation. A similar provision has not been inserted in the Act regarding drilling of 
boreholes. 
The Act provides the Minister responsible for water affairs with extensive powers in regard to 
drilling of boreholes. These include the power to 
·  drill a borehole or sink a well to obtain supplies of water from underground sources, and 
conserve water so obtained and supply or deliver it to any person for use for any purpose 
without payment or upon payment of charges; and      
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·  to drill a borehole or sink a well for any person on the application of such person (Section 5) 
These powers flow from a basic principle in Namibia’s water policy to separate the ownership 
of land from the ownership of water. Property rights to land, be they ownership or customary 
rights, do not imply ownership rights over water below or above the surface of the land. The 
state owns all water resources and is under legal obligation to ensure that these resources are 
managed and used to the benefit of all people. 
 
 
6  Conclusion and way forward 
The concept of integrated land and water management has been adopted in Namibia as the most 
appropriate  way  to  promote  sustainable  development.  A  well  developed  policy  and  legal 
framework has been drawn up to facilitate the implementation of this approach. Implementation 
is in its beginning stages and will face many challenges ahead. These relate to inconsistent poli-
cies and a plethora of institutions with overlapping mandates. Harmonising and integrating sec-
toral policies, particularly with regard to property rights granted to land and other natural re-
sources are of paramount importance.  
The discussion above has shown that the process of granting property rights to water land, wild-
life and forest resources has been erratic and uneven, making it difficult for local communities 
to manage their resources in a meaningful way. Specific areas where current legislation is not 
harmonised include the following: 
·  Group rights to resources: under wildlife legislation, groups of resource users can obtain 
limited rights for the consumptive and non-consumptive use of wildlife and benefit materi-
ally from revenues generated thereby. Similar legislation exists in the forestry sector. With 
regard to water, users of water point obtain property rights to amount to ownership rights. 
However, land legislation does not provide for exclusive group tenure to grazing land. How-
ever, control over access to water effectively provides water user associations with control 
over access to grazing. 
Rights to communal grazing are also not defined in land legislation. While traditional au-
thorities have the power to control grazing both in terms of numbers of livestock grazed and 
the areas in which they are grazed. The rights of conservancies over wildlife do not extend 
to the control of grazing. Community forest management agencies have powers to control 
the use of grazing and other agricultural activities in community forests, subject to a forestry 
management plan. 
·  Institutional mandates: Water legislation transfers ‘ownership’ of water points to commu-
nities. The powers of water user associations include the planning and control of land. Land 
legislation, however, provides powers to traditional leaders to ensure that access to commu-
nal water points is not denied. A further problem is that no clear policy and legal framework 
exists for land use planning. Conservancies develop management plans, but these have no 
legal standing due to the absence of legislation in this regard. 
The  powers  of  the  most  significant  land  management  institutions  at  local  level,  village 
headmen, have not been defined in law. The Communal Land Reform Act vests all powers 
of land allocation in recognised Chiefs and/or Traditional Authorities. 
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Despite these contradictions in legislation it should be remembered that reforms in the natural 
resources sector are an iterative process. They take place in a complex socio-political environ-
ment, where the political balance of forces is shifting constantly as new policies and laws are 
implemented and new institutions arise. On this road, each new step in empowering and enhanc-
ing the capacities of local communities to manage their resources provides opportunities to exert 
some influence on how resources are managed. This is most likely where reforms have resulted 
in a large degree of local level participation, such as in water user associations and conservan-
cies. As these institutions develop further, they will be able to assert their interests and demands 
for more meaningful participation in reforms that were initiated by the state and are imple-
mented in a top down fashion. The latter includes the Communal Land Reform Act.  
Water development projects, and in particular those that are supported by donors, will have to 
find appropriate entry points to achieve acceptance by target communities. It goes without say-
ing that in areas with an established basin management committee, proposed interventions have 
to be discussed with the committee. But there appear to be no legal requirements or mechanisms 
that link basin management committees and local level water institutions. Projects seeking to 
support water development at the local level through new technology or any other means will 
thus also chart new territory in involving local communities in water development within a wa-
ter basin context. 
At the local level, Water Point User Associations and local Water User Associations present 
themselves as a starting point for water development initiatives by dint of the fact that they are 
constituted as legal entities. Their powers to take decisions regarding water development, how-
ever, are limited on account of the fact that the ultimate owner of water is the state. But they are 
entitled to identify water needs and propose possible solutions, which will have to be dealt with 
according to the procedures prescribed in the Water Resources Management Act. 
It must be recognised that local level water institutions operate within a wider social and politi-
cal context which is characterised by overlapping resource rights and nested institutions. Al-
though most of these do not enjoy formal legal status, they have to be acknowledged in the 
process on account of the fact that they play central roles in land administration. Consultations 
and negotiations with village headmen and through them the Traditional Authority and Chief or 
King will have to form part of any initiative to develop water infrastructure. The Regional 
Councillor of the constituency in which the proposed development is to take place needs to be 
part of the process too. Where conservancies or community forests exist, their respective man-
agement committees need to be consulted and informed. Table 1 summarises the mandates of 
the most important institutions at national, regional and sub-regional level with regard to the 
management of key natural resources such as land, grazing and water. 
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Table 1. Institutional mandates over key natural resources 
Resource/  
Activity 
Central Govt.  Regional Govt.  Communal 
Land Boards 
Traditional 
authority 
Water user 
associations/ 
water point 
committees 
Land  Overall control 
by MLRR. 
Traditional 
authority de-
cides on allo-
cation of cus-
tomary title for 
residential and 
crop growing 
land, endorsed 
by Land Board. 
Land Board 
allocates leases, 
endorsed by TA 
No specific 
powers, but 
development 
coordination 
and planning 
function im-
pacts land use 
No direct  
powers of  
allocation.  
Certification 
and registration 
of customary 
land rights. 
Approval and 
allocation of 
leases not ex-
ceeding 50 ha. 
Allocation of 
residential and 
grazing land 
Mgt. and main-
tenance of 
water points/ 
right to exclude 
non-members. 
Legal powers to 
plan and control 
land in the 
vicinity of 
water points 
Water  Overall control 
by MAWF. 
Rights and 
responsibilities 
over water 
points devolved 
to local  
communities 
Regional Water 
Management 
Agency  
responsible for 
coordination & 
planning 
(planned) 
No powers  No specific 
powers except 
duty to ensure 
sustainable 
resource man-
agement 
Management 
and mainte-
nance of water 
points/right  
to exclude  
non-members 
Grazing    No specific 
powers 
No specific 
powers 
No control but 
in some areas 
grant permis-
sion to outsid-
ers for access to 
grazing land 
No specific 
powers 
Land use  
planning 
MLLR has 
overall control 
of land and 
ultimate  
responsibility 
for land use 
planning. 
Responsible for 
development 
planning 
No specific 
powers. Need 
to consulted by 
water user 
associations in 
drawing up 
plans for land 
use and control 
No specific role 
or powers. Im-
portant stake-
holder through 
land allocation 
powers. Need 
to consulted  
by water user 
associations in 
drawing up 
plans for land 
use and control 
Powers to plan 
and control the 
use of commu-
nal land in the 
vicinity of a 
water point in 
co-operation 
with communal 
land board and 
traditional 
authority  
concerned 
Development 
planning 
MRLGH & 
MAWRD  
responsible for 
community 
development. 
Line ministries 
carry out  
planning for 
own projects 
Responsible for 
development of 
regional devel-
opment plans  
& establishing 
constituency 
and local  
development 
committees 
No specific 
powers 
No specific 
roles or powers. 
Important 
stakeholder 
because of  
land allocation 
No specific 
roles or powers. 
Important 
stakeholder 
through control 
of water points 
This table was adapted from a similar table originally developed by Brian Jones. His permission to use it is 
gratefully acknowledged. CuveWaters Papers, No. 5 
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Existing water legislation deals primarily with conventional water sources such as boreholes, for 
example. However, new technologies exist that seek to decrease the reliance on groundwater 
resources. The issue of ownership of new water developments, particularly where they employ 
new technology, needs to be addressed. Access rights to such infrastructure, responsibilities for 
maintenance and replacement are just some of the issues that need to be solved. At present there 
appear to be no ready made answers to this and a solution will have to be negotiated within the 
provisions of the law. 
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